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Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution provides that “[t]he Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the
1
several States.” For sixty years following the New Deal, the Supreme
Court took a hands-off approach in assessing Congress’s assertions of
Commerce Clause authority, going so far as to treat the boundaries of
2
that authority as a political question. In the last twenty years, however, the Court showed a renewed interest in enforcing limitations on
Congress’s assertions of authority under this provision, from its
landmark decisions invalidating congressional enactments in United
3
4
States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison to its underrated decisions
limiting the reach of statutes on Commerce Clause grounds in Jones v.
5
United States and Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United
6
States Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC), to the Commerce Clause
7
ruling in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB).
At the same time, the Court’s engagement in this area has been
marked by caution. Lopez and Morrison involved narrow, single-issue
8
statutes or provisions. Jones and SWANCC relied upon the Commerce
Clause and the doctrine of constitutional avoidance merely to narrow
9
broad statutes. And, NFIB combined the Commerce Clause determination with the same avoidance doctrine to justify upholding the
10
Affordable Care Act as a tax.
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Just as the Court has taken the most careful, preliminary steps toward enforcing limitations on the outer boundaries of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause, some commentators and judges—many of whom are sympathetic to the merits of some judicial
limitations on congressional authority—have argued that the Court
11
must act broadly, or not at all. The most prominent and cogent articulation of this viewpoint comes from Professor Nicholas Quinn
Rosenkranz, whose seminal, brilliant work in The Subjects of the Consti12
13
tution and The Objects of the Constitution inspired this Symposium.
Rosenkranz argues that because the Commerce Clause is directed at
14
Congress (“Congress shall have the power to . . .” ) any challenge to
15
congressional action under that Clause must be “facial.” Specifically, he claims that because the subject of the Commerce Clause is Congress, a decision as to whether Congress exceeded its Commerce
Clause authority in enacting a statute—and thus, violated the Tenth
Amendment’s prohibition against usurping authority “reserved to the
16
States respectively, or to the people” —must be adjudicated as an all17
or-nothing proposition. Professor Rosenkranz’s theory is unquestionably creative constitutional interpretation of the highest caliber.
At the same time, if accepted, it would mean that a court facing an
argument that Congress has exceeded its Commerce Clause authority
must either invalidate the entire statute or uphold the entire statute.
This Article seeks to refute Rosenkranz’s argument that courts
should limit their adjudication of challenges to Congress’s assertions
of Commerce Clause authority to those attacking the entire statutory
provision. Part I provides a primer on as-applied and facial challenges, explaining that the claim that a challenge under a constitutional
provision must be “facial” is—in practical reality—an argument that a
statute is always constitutional in all of its possible applications or unconstitutional in all of its applications, with no middle ground possible. Part II explains the Supreme Court’s modern Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. Part III argues that—contrary to Rosenkranz’s view—
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See, e.g., Nathaniel Stewart, Note, Turning the Commerce Clause Challenge “On Its Face”: Why
Federal Commerce Clause Statutes Demand Facial Challenges, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 161, 164
(2004) (discussing the choice faced by the judiciary to adopt either the as-applied test or
the facial test when analyzing laws challenged under the Commerce Clause (citing United
States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003) (Trott, J., dissenting))).
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209 (2010).
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Objects of the Constitution, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1005 (2011).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Rosenkranz, supra note 12, at 1236.
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
Rosenkranz, supra note 12, at 1248.
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the Constitution’s structure does not require that all Commerce
Clause challenges must be facial; indeed, that structure suggests the
opposite. This Part also argues that Rosenkranz’s facial-only approach would lead to outcomes inconsistent with the meaning of the
Commerce Clause and would undermine the Supreme Court’s nascent project to enforce the limitations on that Clause. Finally, Part IV
suggests two as-applied decision rules under modern Supreme Court
doctrine, which can serve as a starting point to reinvigorate as-applied
adjudication in this area.
I. PRIMER ON FACIAL AND AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES
To evaluate Professor Rosenkranz’s argument that all Commerce
Clause challenges must be “facial,” as opposed to “as-applied,” it is essential to understand with some precision what these terms mean. In
a recent article in the Virginia Law Review, Scott A. Keller and I endeavored to define those terms by reference to the practice of
18
courts.
First, some basics. Courts do not simply look at a constitutional
phrase like “[t]he Congress shall have power . . . [t]o regulate Com19
merce . . . among the several States,” compare it to the statute that
Congress enacted, and thus decide the question of whether the statute exceeds Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause. Judicial review is often a complicated task, which requires the court to
consider factors such as mandates of the text, how those mandates
compare to the statute Congress enacted, how courts in the future
should determine whether Congress has exceeded its constitutional
authority, and the institutional limitations of the judicial branch. Put
another way, to determine whether Congress has exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause, courts need judicially enforceable
tools to translate the Constitution’s phrases into doctrines that can be
enforced across a broad range of complicated statutes and situa20
21
tions. These judicial tools are known as “decision rules.” To take
18
19
20

21

Scott A. Keller & Misha Tseytlin, Applying Constitutional Decision Rules Versus Invalidating
Statutes In Toto, 98 VA. L. REV. 301 (2012).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
See Keller & Tseytlin, supra note 18, at 320–21 (contending that the court has created a
variety of constitutional decisional rules to “enforce the Constitution’s provisions and
constrain lower courts as they adjudicate constitutional disputes”).
See Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decisional Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2004)
(“[D]octrines that direct courts how to decide whether a constitutional operative proposition is satisfied [are] constitutional decisional rules.” (internal quotations omitted)); Keller & Tseytlin, supra note 18, at 318 (“The identification of constitutional defects is guided by what many scholars have identified as ‘constitutional decision rules.’”); Lawrence
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the most relevant example for present purposes, the Supreme Court
has created a series of decision rules in the Commerce Clause context, including that a court will not invalidate a congressional action
where it determines that there is a “rational basis” for concluding that
the statute regulates “activities, taken in the aggregate, [that] substan22
tially affect interstate commerce.” Even this complex articulation of
the Commerce Clause decision rule is an oversimplification, as Part II
will discuss.
Court-created decision rules rarely attempt to enforce the Constitution’s requirements completely. Instead, they incorporate the
comparative institutional (in)competence of the judiciary vis-à-vis the
politically accountable branches. For example, deferential standards
of review such as “rational basis,” by definition, acknowledge that the
courts will not fully enforce a constitutional provision, out of due re23
spect for a co-equal branch.
Acknowledging that many decision
rules are not designed to fully enforce the Constitution does not
mean that the courts can legitimately change the Constitution’s
meaning; to the contrary, well-designed decision rules should derive
from the Constitution’s actual meaning, while at the same time acknowledging that the courts are just one of three co-equal federal actors charged with enforcing the Constitution.
Some decision rules train the courts’ focus broadly on a statute as
a whole, while others permit (or require) courts to look only at a
small sliver of a statute’s application. To take the simplest example,
in the rare circumstances where the Supreme Court has adopted decision rules that require courts to look to the motivation underlying a
statute, these rules necessarily require evaluating the statute as a
24
whole. One such decision rule is the so-called Lemon test, which asks
whether the enactment was motivated by a desire to suppress reli25
gion. That decision rule necessarily applies to the statute at its root,

22
23

24

25

Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV.
L. REV. 1212, 1214–15 (1978) (“In applying provisions of the Constitution to the challenged behavior of state or federal officials, the federal courts have modeled analytical
structures . . . .”).
See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005).
See Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court
Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1653 (2005) (observing that the Court, when applying rationalbasis review, defers to Congress’s constitutionality determinations in Commerce Clause
legislation even if the determination is imperfect).
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113
HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1345 (2000) (“[S]ome constitutional tests identify defects in a statute’s historical origins or motivations that pervade all possible subrules through which
the statute might be specified.”).
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
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as the congressional motivation to harm a particular religion is not
amenable to a narrowed focus on a particular subclass of persons the
26
statute covers. On the other end of the spectrum, a decision rule
that requires a court to focus on the burden the statute places on any
individual litigant—such as the undue-burden test in the Due Process
27
Clause/abortion context —is unlikely to train a court’s eye on the
statute’s entire reach, as the amount of burden each person (or class
of persons) will experience under the statute will almost necessarily
28
vary.
So what of as-applied and facial challenges? The Supreme Court
has explained that “[a]s-applied challenges are the basic building
29
blocks of constitutional adjudication.” Put another way, in the runof-the-mill constitutional challenge, a litigant brings a lawsuit (or is
subject to a lawsuit or a criminal prosecution by the government) and
then, invokes a constitutional provision to vindicate his or her rights.
As the court adjudicates the case, the decision rule applicable to the
constitutional provision will inform how broadly the court reasons.
The breadth of that reasoning may, as a matter of precedent or persuasive authority, impact a significant number of other cases. In this
way, every case is an as-applied challenge.
But that is three-quarters of the story. The Supreme Court has
held that, under some circumstances, a court should go beyond
merely adjudicating a case as-applied to the particular facts of the
case and declaring the rights of the parties before it, and should hold
that the entire statute is unenforceable in toto. To implement this
remedial doctrine, the Court has designed what Scott Keller and I
30
have labeled “invalidation rules.” By far, the most straightforward
and commonly used invalidation rule is the Salerno doctrine, which
derives its name from the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
31
Salerno. Under this doctrine, a court should only invalidate a statute
in toto if “the challenger [can] establish that no set of circumstances
32
exists under which the Act would be valid.” That is, a court should
invalidate a statute in whole where the court’s application of the rele26
27
28
29
30

31
32

Keller & Tseytlin, supra note 18, at 328–29.
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992).
See Keller & Tseytlin, supra note 18, at 360 (explaining that the “undue burden” test established in Casey limited courts’ ability to invalidate abortion regulations in toto).
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007) (quoting Fallon, supra note 24, at 1328).
See Keller & Tseytlin, supra note 18, at 325 (defining the term “invalidation rule” as a judicially created rule for determining a remedy after a constitutional violation has been
found).
481 U.S. 739 (1987).
Id. at 745.

484

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 16:2

vant decision rules makes clear that any challenge to the statute
33
would succeed, in every application. The Salerno invalidation rule
rests on a commonsense proposition: if the court applying the relevant decision rule can readily determine that the statute has no constitutional application, then it should so hold, informing citizens and
public officials that the statute, as a whole, is unenforceable. The Salerno invalidation rule, while it may seem exceedingly difficult to satisfy due to its categorical nature, is actually used fairly commonly, as
courts’ reasoning under decision rules often covers the reach of the
34
entire statute.
Given that as-applied challenges are the basic building blocks of
constitutional adjudication and that “facial” challenges are the product of invalidation rules superimposed upon such as-applied challenges, it is fair to ask whether the argument that a particular constitutional provision permits only facial adjudication is coherent at all.
There is, however, a way to reframe the question to be fair to Professor Rosenkranz’s argument that Commerce Clause challenges must
be adjudicated facially. The Salerno doctrine provides that where a
particular decision rule adheres in all of a statute’s possible applications, the statute must be invalidated in toto; accordingly, if successful
adjudication under a particular decision rule will always satisfy Salerno, one can confidently conclude that adjudication under that decision rule is exclusively “facial.” For example, if the Lemon test was the
only decision rule in the Establishment Clause context, then all adjudication under the Clause would be “facial.” When Professor
Rosenkranz claims that all challenges under the Commerce Clause
must be “facial,” what he is saying, as a practical, real-world matter, is
that court adjudication of congressional enactment of statutes under
that Clause must always either lead to wholesale affirmance of the enactment or in toto invalidation; it must be an all-or-nothing proposition. The court is not allowed to say: “Congress violated the Constitution by attempting to prohibit the relevant conduct at issue in this
particular case under its Commerce Clause power, and we need not
35
make any further comment.”
33
34

35

Keller & Tseytlin, supra note 18, at 326.
See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99 CALIF. L. REV.
915 (2011) (finding that use of facial challenges like the Salerno invalidation rule to challenge the validity of statutes is much more common than the conventional wisdom assumes); Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 359 (1998) (arguing that the Salerno invalidation rule is not as
stringent as it is perceived).
Notably, the Salerno invalidation rule is not the only invalidation rule that the Court has
adopted. In the Free Speech Clause context, the Court has created the “overbreadth”
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II. THE MODERN COMMERCE CLAUSE CASE LAW
After sixty years of a hands-off approach to the Commerce Clause,
the Supreme Court began to re-engage in United States v. Lopez and
United States v. Morrison, by invalidating in toto a provision prohibiting
anyone from possessing a firearm in a school zone and a federal
cause of action for gender-motivated violence. In those cases, the
Court went beyond as-applied adjudication—which would have involved merely holding that the defendant in Lopez could not be prosecuted and the defendant in Morrison could not be subject to a civil
action—and discussed its justification for “invalidat[ing]” both stat36
utes.
Lopez and Morrison announced a series of Commerce Clause decision rules, which courts could use to determine whether Congress
exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause in future cases.
Under these rules, in order to decide whether the Commerce Clause
authorized Congress’s actions, a court has to determine whether the
statute regulates (1) “the use of the channels of interstate commerce”; (2) “the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons
or things in interstate commerce”; and (3) “those activities that sub37
stantially affect interstate commerce.” Lopez and Morrison dealt with
this last, most controversial category by announcing a further-refined
decision rule which required a court to decide whether Congress had
a “rational basis” for concluding that the regulated activity, taken in
38
aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce. And, in determining whether Congress satisfied this “substantive affects” test, the
39
Court emphasized the importance of the activity being “economic,”

36

37
38
39

doctrine, which permits a court to declare a statute void in toto based upon a finding that
a statue is unconstitutional in a substantial number of its applications, compared to the
statute’s constitutional reach. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973); Keller &
Tseytlin, supra note 18, at 348. The possibility of an alternative invalidation rule does not
seem, however, to have any relevance to a claim that adjudication under a particular decision rule must always be facial. This is because the very concept of overbreadth invalidation presupposes that there can be a number of successful as-applied challenges to a statute but not a sufficient number to satisfy the overbreadth standard. Put another way, the
relevance of the overbreadth invalidation rule is directly tied to the existence of asapplied decision rules.
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580
(1995). This Article will later address whether the Court acted properly and coherently
in invoking the Salerno invalidation rule for these statutes. See infra pp. 490, 493.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608–09 (internal citations omitted); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59 (internal citations omitted).
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612–13; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556–58.
See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (“Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense
of the phrase, economic activity.”); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (“Section 922(q) is a criminal
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adding that “[w]hile we need not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity . . . thus far in our
Nation’s history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation
40
of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature.”
The Court has also invoked the limitations of the Commerce
Clause to narrow congressional enactments under the cannon of
41
constitutional avoidance. In Jones v. United States, a unanimous Supreme Court creatively constricted the federal arson statute—which
made it a crime to destroy “by means of fire or an explosive,
any . . . property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce”—to apply only to the
42
burning of commercial buildings. The Court justified this interpretation by reliance on Lopez’s limitations on the Commerce Clause au43
thority, combined with the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.
44
And, in SWANCC, the Court made clear that the doctrines announced in Lopez and Morrison went beyond federalizing local criminal law. In SWANCC, the Court held that the Clean Water Act
(“CWA”) coverage of “waters of the United States” did not encompass
land containing permanent and seasonal ponds. In explaining its
narrow reading of the CWA, which was contrary to the interpretation
of the CWA adopted by the Army Corps of Engineers, the Court noted that a broader reading of the statute would “push the limit of congressional authority” by forcing the Court to determine whether the
regulation fell within “Congress’ power to regulate intrastate activities
45
that ‘substantially affect’ interstate commerce.”
Addressing this
question would force the Court “to evaluate the precise object or activity that, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate com46
merce.”
The Supreme Court’s next adjudication under Commerce Clause
47
decision rules came in Gonzales v. Raich. There, the Court considered whether Congress exceeded its authority under the Controlled
Substances Act (“CSA”), as applied to “the intrastate manufacture
and possession of marijuana for medical purposes pursuant to Cali-

40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

statute that by its terms has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms.”).
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (emphasis added).
529 U.S. 848 (2000).
18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2006); Jones, 529 U.S. at 859.
Jones, 529 U.S at 857–58.
531 U.S. 159 (2001).
Id. at 173.
Id.
545 U.S. 1 (2005).
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48

fornia law.” The Court explained that the petitioners had conceded
that the entire category of activities that the CSA covered had, in the
49
aggregate, “substantially affect[ed] interstate commerce.” Addressing the plaintiffs’ narrower argument that their activities could not
50
constitutionally be swept into this “concededly valid” regime, the
Court quoted its earlier pronouncement—repeated in Lopez—that
when “a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to
commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising
51
under that statute is of no consequence,” adding that “[w]here the
class of activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power ‘to excise, as trivial, individual
52
instances’ of the class.” The Court explained that it was “appropriate to include marijuana grown for home consumption in the CSA
[because of] the likelihood that the high demand in the interstate
market will draw such marijuana into that market,” adding that Congress had a “rational basis for believing that failure to regulate the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana would leave a gap53
ing hole in the CSA.” And, in responding to the argument that the
plaintiffs’ activities could not be regulated under the Commerce
Clause because they are non-economic, the Court explained that
“[u]nlike those at issue in Lopez and Morrison, the activities regulated
by the CSA are quintessentially economic. ‘Economics’ refers to ‘the
54
production, distribution, and consumption of commodities.’”
The Supreme Court’s latest pronouncement on the scope of con55
gressional authority under the Commerce Clause came in NFIB,
where five Justices wrote or joined opinions concluding that requiring people to buy health insurance exceeded Congress’s authority
under Lopez’s “substantially affects interstate commerce” decision
rule. These opinions explained that a person’s decision not to engage in an activity, such as purchasing insurance, was not the sort of
“economic activity” that could be aggregated under the third Lopez
56
prong. Then, the Chief Justice, using a variant of the approach in

48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

Id. at 15.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 17 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Raich, 545 U.S. at 23 (quoting Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971)).
Id. at 19, 22.
Id. at 25–26 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 720 (Philip Babcock Gove ed., 3d ed. 1966)).
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
Id. at 2587, 2647–48.
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SWANCC, read the statute to avoid this constitutional problem by
concluding that the individual mandate could be recast as a tax, even
though he concluded that this was not the most “natural[]” reading
57
of the provision.
III. IN DEFENSE OF AS-APPLIED COMMERCE CLAUSE CHALLENGES
The Court’s recent decision in NFIB illustrates that post-Raich re58
ports of the death of the Lopez/Morrison Commerce Clause revival
were greatly exaggerated. Instead, the Supreme Court doctrine in
this area remains in a state of flux. The Court is seeking—indeed,
grasping—to create decision rules that provide meaningful limitations on Congress’s authority under the Commerce Cause, while at
the same time showing understandable trepidation about invalidating
broad laws such as the Affordable Care Act, the CWA, and the CSA.
In the face of this uncertainty, Rosenkranz has provided a powerful
voice in favor of the Court deciding Commerce Clause cases broadly
or not at all. This Part aims to show that limiting Commerce Clause
adjudication in the manner that Rosenkranz urges is not required by
the constitutional text (indeed, arguably it is contrary to that text in
most cases), would lead to results inconsistent with the Commerce
Clause’s mandates, and would stunt the Supreme Court’s fragile project to enforce some limitations on Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.
Rosenkranz’s primary argument is that the structure of the Com59
merce Clause requires only facial challenges. Under Rosenkranz’s
logic, because the subject of the Commerce Clause is Congress, any
challenge to Congress’s authority under that Clause must be facial,
since Congress must be the constitutional culprit in any assertion that
Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause authority. As Rosenkranz
explains, “[i]f Congress violated the Constitution by making a law,
basic remedial principles suggest that the Court should accord the violation no legal effect and should instead restore the law to the pre60
violation status quo.”

57
58

59
60

Id. at 2594–601.
See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Is Morrison Dead? Assessing a Supreme Drug (Law) Overdose, 9
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 751 (2005) (arguing for the death of Morrison and evolution towards broader reaching federal laws). But see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Medical Marijuana
Case: A Commerce Clause Counter-Revolution?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 879 (2005) (arguing
that declarations of Morrison’s death are exaggerated).
Rosenkranz, supra note 12, at 1275.
Id. at 1248.
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Rosenkranz’s linguistic analysis correctly identifies that only Congress can exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. But, this
insight does not suggest that in toto invalidation is a mandatory remedy for such an overreach. Recall, for example, the Supreme Court’s
61
decision in SWANCC. If Congress had specifically defined “waters of
the United States” in the CWA as including seasonal ponds—and, assuming, arguendo, that reaching some such ponds is beyond Congress’s Commerce Clause authority—it would have been wholly consistent with the Commerce Clause’s structure for the Court to
invalidate the CWA only to the extent that it applied to those ponds.
62
Put in Rosenkranz’s terms, while the “constitutional culprit” would
be Congress, its “crime” would be enacting a statute that—in some
small measure—exceeded its Commerce Clause authority. Or, as
Professor Gillian E. Metzger put it, “no logical reason exists why a litigant could not . . . allege that part of a statutory provision is unconstitutional or that a statute is unconstitutional in a particular range of
63
applications, even if not unconstitutional in all or most.”
A deeper look at Rosenkranz’s linguistic analysis of the Constitution actually supports the conclusion that in toto is rarely appropriate
in the Commerce Clause context. As Rosenkranz points out, Congress cannot actually violate the Commerce Clause; rather, it can only
violate the Tenth Amendment when it makes a law that exceeds its
64
authority under the enumerated powers. But, consider what could
justify a court in invoking the Salerno invalidation rule to begin with.
In the case of an external limitation on congressional authority—
such, for example, as the Establishment Clause—the justification for
in toto invalidation is straightforward: if, under the relevant decision
rule, the statute violates the Establishment Clause in all of its applications, Salerno invalidation of the statute must follow. Or, put more
simply, if Congress has enacted a statute that establishes a religion,
Congress’s actions are wholly invalid. But, since Congress cannot actually violate the Commerce Clause, the only basis upon which Salerno
invalidation would be appropriate is if the court looked at the statute,
under every potentially relevant enumerated power, and then determined
that the statute was categorically authorized by none of those powers
in every instance. That inquiry would seem to be an incredibly timeconsuming task and one which would force the court to violate the
“the fundamental principle of judicial restraint that courts should
61
62
63
64

531 U.S. 159 (2001).
Rosenkranz, supra note 12, at 1277.
Gillian E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 881 (2005).
Rosenkranz, supra note 12, at 1287.
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[not] anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the ne65
cessity of deciding it.”
Take a concrete example: in the earliest successful Commerce
66
Clause challenge, United States v. Dewitt, the Supreme Court held
that the Commerce Clause did not authorize Congress to prohibit the
selling of combustible illuminating oils, but did not invalidate the
statute in toto. Instead, the Court observed that the prohibition
would continue to have effect where Congress had plenary legislative
67
authority, “as for example, in the District of Columbia.” Dewitt’s refusal to invalidate the statute in toto is wholly consistent with
Rosenkranz’s linguistic analysis that Congress cannot actually violate
the Commerce Clause but merely violates the Tenth Amendment. In
a particular case, a court can conclude that Congress exceeded its
Commerce Clause authority in enacting the statute and that, if the
Commerce Clause was the only font of authority that the government
invoked, the government should lose the case. However, the Court
need not definitively decide whether the same statute may be authorized by a different enumerated power in other instances not before
the Court, such as within the District of Columbia, where the Constitution authorizes Congress “[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all
68
Cases whatsoever.”
This account calls into question whether the Court was correct in
its in toto invalidation of the statutes in Lopez and Morrison. After all,
it is not clear that Congress exceeded its constitutional authority to
the extent that it was prohibiting gun possession in the District of Columbia. Perhaps the result more consistent with the Constitution’s
text would have been for the Court to declare that the statute could
not constitutionally be applied to Mr. Lopez (and, by logical implication, all others similarly situated), leaving for another day the question of whether that statute was invalid in all of its applications.
Rosenkranz’s remaining argument against as-applied Commerce
Clause challenges is that “[i]f congressmen are to be accused of violating their oaths and Congress is to be accused of violating the Constitution, the doctrinal test must be one that they could have applied
when making the law,” meaning that “it must be that the violation is
69
visible on the ‘face’ of the statute.” There are at least two flaws in
65
66
67
68
69

Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41 (1869).
Id. at 45.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Rosenkranz, supra note 12, at 1278–79.
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this argument. First, it is possible—indeed, far from difficult—to design decision rules that could be applied by a “conscientious congressman” at the time of enactment, which nevertheless would not
require the entire statute be invalided in toto. In Part IV, for example, this Article argues that Supreme Court doctrine suggests an asapplied decision rule that would permit a court to invalidate a portion of a statute that applied to intrastate noneconomic conduct—or
non-conduct—even if the rest of the statute applies to economic
conduct that, taken in the aggregate, has a substantial effect on inter70
state commerce. A congressman deciding whether to vote in favor
of a statute could make this inquiry in the same manner as a court
would and vote against a law that regulates—even in small part—
some intrastate noneconomic activity. Second, there is no textual basis for Rosenkranz’s intuition that legislators would be more offended
by broader adjudication, which invalidates their entire handiwork.
To the contrary, one could plausibly argue that a healthy respect for a
co-equal branch would suggest that the Court should not, at a very
minimum, create decision rules that require it to decide each Commerce Clause case as broadly as possible. Rather, it should design
rules that permit courts to narrow congressional enactments to avoid
constitutional problems, where possible, and to invalidate narrow
slivers of statutes, where avoidance is not possible. That mode is consistent with the principle that a court should seek to avoid
“formulat[ing] a rule of constitutional law broader than is required
71
by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.”
Rosenkranz’s approach to the Commerce Clause is also potentially
harmful to the project of enforcing the limitations in the Commerce
Clause. If the Court were to adopt the principle that all adjudication
under the Commerce Clause must be facial, this would narrow the
Court’s ability to design decision rules that enforce the limitations on
Commerce Clause authority consistent with text, precedent, and the
comparative competence of courts. To allow for facial-only adjudication of Commerce Clause cases, the Court would have to design decision rules that apply to every application of a statute and can never
72
apply to less than the entire statute.
Designing a facial-only decision rule that would lead to adjudication that dutifully enforces the Commerce Clause’s limitations would
be difficult; indeed, probably impossible. Take, for example,
70
71
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See infra pp. 495–96.
Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
See supra pp. 482–83; see generally Keller & Tseytlin, supra note 18, at 328–29.
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Rosenkranz’s suggested decision rule: any statute that invokes Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause must have an “affects
73
interstate commerce” hook in the text of the statute. This proposed
rule is likely both overinclusive and underinclusive. On one hand, no
provision in the Constitution requires Congress to specifically state
the invocation of that power on the face of legislation. Thus, if courts
were to apply Rosenkranz’s suggested decision rule with fidelity, then
they would invalidate numerous statutes based not upon an analysis
of the Commerce Clause’s text and history, but upon Congress’s failure to follow a court-created rule. On the other hand, Rosenkranz’s
proposed rule may overlook actions that exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. For instance, the anticommandeering doctrine is based upon the understanding that the Commerce Clause
does not authorize Congress to force state officials to enforce federal
74
law. It is at least arguable that Congress could not force state officials to do Congress’s bidding, even if the Government could prove
that failure to abide by such a mandate would “affect interstate commerce.”
Of course, one could imagine any number of Commerce Clause
decision rules that apply to the entire statute as a whole; or, one
could add the anticommandeering decision rule as an additional rule
to Rosenkranz’s proposed rule. But, the point is that whatever facialonly decision rule—or series of rules—scholars and courts envision,
those rules will likely suffer one of two problems and sometimes both.
The rules will either be overbroad, such that it will require the courts
to invalidate wholesale broad congressional enactments, where Congress’s transgression is relatively minor compared to the scope of the
law. Or they would permit Congress to exceed its authority under the
Commerce Clause by hiding otherwise unconstitutional assertions of
authority in broad statutes. These problems are acute because the art
of modern legislation is a complex endeavor, especially in the field of
the flow of goods among the states. It is difficult to envision that anyone could design facial-only decision rules that would apply across
every application of every possible statute that implicates the Commerce Clause and which would yield results consistent with the Constitution, under any interpretative theory.
In sharp contrast to the facial-only approach, permitting the
Court to design narrower decision rules, which would encourage as73
74

Rosenkranz, supra note 12, at 1281.
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174–77 (1992) (invalidating the take title
provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 on these
grounds).
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applied adjudication, would give courts the flexibility to tailor the
cure to the constitutional malady. A court confined to a facial-only
approach to the Commerce Clause has, in effect, only two options:
either uphold the statute in its entirety or declare that Congress has
violated the Constitution and then, strike down the statute in toto by
applying the Salerno invalidation rule. Such a limitation could be disastrous to the development of the law in this area. The impetus for
Lopez, Morrison, and the general modern thrust of the Supreme
Court’s Commerce Clause doctrine is to find some limitations to
75
Congress’s authority consistent with the “non-infinity principle.”
Put another way, the Constitution created a government of limited,
enumerated powers, which presupposes a quantum of authority not
delegated to Congress. At the same time, as Michael E. Rosman—a
proponent of Rosenkranz’s facial-only approach—admits, the Court
is “unlikely to declare a . . . broad and all-encompassing [stat76
ute]. . . unconstitutional.” The Chief Justice’s struggle to find a way
to uphold the Affordable Care Act in NFIB is a testament to that fact.
In light of this reality, scholars and litigants should encourage the
Court to strive to create narrower decision rules in the Commerce
Clause, which would not call for in toto invalidation. This would allow the Court to avoid the daunting all-or-nothing choice when facing a dubious assertion of congressional authority. It would encourage the courts to use the common law method, working one case at a
time, without needing to apply decision rules that measure whether
Congress violated the Constitution in every instance where the statute
77
operates. At the same time, the development of a robust as-applied
Commerce Clause doctrine would discourage Congress from, as Justice Sandra Day O’Connor warned in her Raich dissent, “nestling
questionable assertions of its authority into comprehensive regulatory
78
schemes.” At the very minimum, recognition of the possibility of
meritorious as-applied challenges will permit courts to use the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to trim the constitutionally questionable boundaries of broad statutes such as the CWA, instead of
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Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or What if the
Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 369, 376.
Michael E. Rosman, Facial Challenges and the Commerce Clause: Rethinking Lopez and Morrison, 4 FAULKNER L. REV. 1, 29 (2012).
See Edward A. Hartnett, Modest Hope for a Modest Roberts Court: Deference, Facial Challenges,
and the Comparative Competence of Courts, 59 SMU L. REV. 1735, 1753 (2006).
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 43 (2004) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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concluding—with the dissenters in SWANCC—that because the CWA
79
is not invalid in whole, no such trimming should take place.
IV. TWO MODEST AS-APPLIED COMMERCE CLAUSE DECISION RULES
A final objection to the argument in defense of as-applied Commerce Clause adjudication is precedential: after the Supreme Court
decided Raich, most commentators concluded that as-applied Com80
merce Clause challenges were now foreclosed. Courts of appeals
generally agree; as Professor David. L. Franklin has explained, “lower
courts have reacted to Raich by declining to entertain as-applied chal81
lenges under the Commerce Clause.” Even the few courts of appeals that had ruled in favor of challengers in as-applied Commerce
Clause cases in the wake of Lopez and Morrison held that those prior
82
cases were no longer good law after Raich.
This reaction rests on an overreading of Raich. After all, Raich did
not rebuff the as-applied Commerce Clause challenge categorically,
83
as Rosenkranz believes it should have. Instead, the Court rejected
the challenge only after reaching two conclusions necessary to its
holding: (1) the CSA regulated economic activity, including Ms.
84
Raich’s cultivation and subsequent possession of marijuana and (2)
it was rational for Congress to include homegrown marijuana, for
private use, within the CSA’s prohibition because such marijuana is
85
fungible with marijuana that is traded in the interstate drug market.
Accordingly, if the Supreme Court accepted the argument that asapplied Commerce Clause challenges should become an important
79
80

81
82

83
84
85

Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S.
159, 192–97 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See Fallon, supra note 34, at 936 (arguing that Raich “can be read as rejecting the possibility of successful as-applied challenges to assertions of legislative power under the Commerce Clause”); Alex Kreit, Rights, Rules, and Raich, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 705, 706 (2006)
(“After Raich . . . facial challenges appear to be the only type of Commerce Clause challenge that remains viable.”). But see Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Limiting Raich, 9 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 743, 745 (2005) (arguing that as-applied challenges remain viable after
Raich).
David L. Franklin, Facial Challenges, Legislative Purpose, and the Commerce Clause, 92 IOWA L.
REV. 41, 52 n.46 (2006).
See e.g., United States v. Bowers, 594 F.3d 522, 529 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Raich makes
clear . . . that Lopez and Morrison are no longer the controlling authorities in this type of
as-applied challenge.”); United States v. McCalla, 545 F.3d 750, 754–55 (9th Cir. 2008)
(following Raich rather than Lopez and Morrison); United States v. Stewart, 451 F.3d 1071,
1073–77 (9th Cir. 2006) (reconsidering its prior holding after Raich); United States v.
Maxwell, 446 F.3d 1210, 1213–16 (11th Cir. 2000) (same).
Rosenkranz, supra note 12, at 1279.
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25–26 (2005).
Id. at 19, 22.
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tool in trimming overreach by Congress, then Raich provides it with
two ready-made decision rules to apply when dealing with assertions
of authority under Lopez’s “substantially effects” prong.
A. The statute regulates both economic and non-economic activity, and the
challengers’ action falls within the non-economic sphere.
In Lopez and Morrison, the Supreme Court held that intrastate activities at issue there could not be aggregated under Lopez’s “substantially effects” prong. Put another way, no matter the combined economic impact of crimes outlawed by the statutes in Lopez and
Morrison, the impact of those non-economic activities could not be
aggregated to justify a statute under the Commerce Clause. As the
Court explained in Morrison, “While we need not adopt a categorical
rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity in
order to decide these cases, thus far . . . our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity
86
is economic in nature.” From this principle, one can—at least arguably—derive the rule that if a statute regulates both economic and
non-economic activities, then the statute’s constitutionality can only
turn on the aggregation of the economic activities; at the same time,
the non-economic activities, which could not be regulated under the
Commerce Clause and, thus, could not possibly provide the constitutional justification, would remain outside of Congress’s reach. Thus,
if Congress passed a law that banned the possession of guns in school
zones as part of a broader prohibition that encompassed economic
activity, then Mr. Lopez would seem to have a strong argument that
his mere possession of the gun in the school zone did not subject him
to federal authority under the Commerce Clause. In this way, Lopez
and Morrison are not—as Justice O’Connor feared—”nothing more
87
than a drafting guide.” As properly understood, Congress can draft
no law, no matter how narrow or broad, which would go beyond regulating economic activity, at least under Lopez’s “substantial effects”
prong.
Nor does the Court’s holding in Raich extend Congress’s Commerce Clause authority beyond the regulation of intrastate economic
activity which, taken in the aggregate, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The Court in Raich did not hold that the nature
of Ms. Raich’s activity was immaterial. Instead, the Court adopted a
broad definition of “[e]conomics” as meaning “the production, dis86
87

United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000).
Raich, 545 U.S. at 46 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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tribution, and consumption of commodities” and then, held that Ms.
88
Raich’s conduct fell within that definition. While this definition is
broad, it is consistent with Lopez’s recitation of the Court’s prior holding as applying only to “economic activities,” including “intrastate
coal mining,” “restaurants utilizing substantial interstate supplies,”
“hotels catering to interstate guests,” and—most on point—
89
“consumption of homegrown wheat.” At the same time, this definition of “economic activity” is not unlimited. Under Lopez, the mere
possession of a gun in a school zone is not an economic activity; under Morrison, the commission of a violent crime that involves no element of an economic motive is not an economic activity; and, under
NFIB, refusing to enter into a market is not an economic activity.
Other cases may well provide additional categories of non-economic
activities, which Congress cannot regulate in order to forestall effects
on interstate commerce. Or, the Court may choose to narrow the
range of what is an “economic activity,” especially when dealing in an
area of historical state concern. And, if a litigant can identify its activity as fitting within a subclass that is a noneconomic activity or no activity at all, then that litigant should be able to prevail on an asapplied Commerce Clause challenge, even if the rest of the statute’s
regulation of economic activity remains undisturbed.
B. The statute sweeps in a substantial class of conduct that is too attenuated
from the class of conduct that gives rise to substantial effects on interstate
commerce.
In Raich’s misunderstood passage, the Court explained that because the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress “to regulate purely
local activities that are part of an economic ‘class of activities’ that
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce,” where “‘a general
regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de
minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is
90
of no consequence.’” This statement, if properly understood, merely stands for the proposition that if a congressionally defined “class of
activities” has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, then the
fact that each individual instance of that activity does not itself have an
88
89
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Id. at 25–26 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 54 at
720).
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559–60 (1995) (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining
& Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981), Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964),
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), and Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942)).
Raich, 545 U.S. at 17 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197 n.27 (1968)).
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effect on interstate commerce is of no moment. At the same time, as
Judge Higginbotham, explained even before Raich,
[I]ndividual acts cannot be aggregated if their effects on commerce
are causally independent of one another. That is, if the effect on interstate commerce directly attributable to one instance of an activity does
not depend in substantial part on how many other instances of the activity occur, there is an insufficient connection—in other words, an interactive effect—and the effect of different instances cannot be added. If, on
the other hand, the occurrence of one instance of the activity makes it
substantially more or less likely that other instances will occur, then there
is an interactive effect and the effects of different instances can be add91
ed.

Under this understanding, Congress could rationally determine that
legal permission for some citizens to grow and consume home-grown
marijuana would impact “demand” for other marijuana in the interstate market, rendering irrelevant that any particular instance of
home-grown marijuana did not have a substantial effect on interstate
92
commerce.
Following from this understanding, Raich left open a decision rule
permitting a party to argue that its activities—or subclass of activities—are not causally related to the economic activities that the statute regulates under Lopez’s substantial effects prong. For example, if
a statute regulated a class of economic activities that, taken in aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce, but also sweeps in another class of activities with no causal relationship to the core class
being regulated, then there would be no reason in logic or precedent
to permit Congress to sweep in that second, unrelated class.
Finally, even if the Court balks at either of the above described asapplied decision rules in isolation, then at very minimum, they can be
combined into one rule, which would prohibit Congress from using
its Commerce Clause authority to regulate noneconomic activity that
is too tangentially related to the core economic activity that the statute regulates. Consider, for example, Section 1532 of the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). The ESA prohibits anyone from “taking”
endangered species, with “take” being defined as “pursue, hunt,
93
shoot, wound, kill, trap, [and] capture.” It is at least arguable that
the “taking” prohibition applies to economic activity—for example,
“hunting” endangered species—whereas other taking activity—such
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United States v. Hickman, 179 F.3d 230, 233 (5th Cir. 1999) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
Raich, 545 U.S. at 19, 22.
16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1973).
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94

as a “lone hiker” “killing” an endangered local gnat—would not be
“economic.” In addition, it is far from clear whether protection of
particularly isolated species, which do not travel across state lines,
have any interactive effect with the ESA’s broader regime. And, while
lower courts have thus far uniformly rejected as-applied challenges to
the ESA, those courts have often disagreed within the same panel,
95
and among themselves, as to the rationale for these decisions. This
suggests an opportunity for a properly articulated as-applied Commerce Clause challenge to Section 9 of the ESA to—at minimum—
trim the application of the statute to clearly non-economic activities,
96
similar to the Court’s decision in SWANCC.
CONCLUSION
The two proposed as-applied decision rules above are modest in
character and are unlikely—standing on their own—to achieve the
Court’s goal of finding meaningful limitations on Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, while proceeding in a measured manner that
does not disturb decades of settled expectations. The important
point is that as the Court continues in the task of crafting Commerce
Clause decision rules, there is no basis to remove wholesale from its
judicial toolbox the ability to create rules that permit litigation with a
scalpel, not a meat cleaver. There are cases where broader adjudication is appropriate, where such adjudication can more fully and dutifully enforce the Constitution. But, that is not always the case.
94
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Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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regulation under the Commerce Clause for similar reasons); Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Roberts, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (concluding that the panel opinion misapplied the Commerce Clause in
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Criminal Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1991, 2032 (2008) (“[E]nvironmental regulations
should be upheld as valid only when applied to actors such as businesses and real estate
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While this Article has ostensibly been about as-applied decision
rules, there is a deeper issue of constitutional adjudication at stake.
The variety and complexity of laws, at both the federal and state levels, has grown. Those laws interact with the powers and limitations in
the Constitution in complicated—often surprising—ways, especially
when one takes into account the gloss added by two centuries of
Court doctrine. In such a complex world, it is highly unlikely that
any judge or scholar would be able to design doctrines that always
and only measure constitutional provisions in all of their applications,
which also accurately reflect the meaning of constitutional provisions,
under any theory of the Constitution.
The deeper point is that the search for facial-only doctrines is not
worth the candle, under any provision. Nothing in Article III, the judicial power, or any constitutional provision requires courts to only
measure the constitutionality of congressional actions in all of their
applications, as opposed to taking a more flexible approach and deciding that some actions, by some actors, violate the Constitution in
the part relevant to the challenge being brought, leaving for another
day—and, for the application of the venerable common law method—a wholesale challenge to Congress’s actions. That is not to say
that facial challenges should never be permissible, or should always
be disfavored. Far from it. The point is that a per se rule under any
constitutional provision requiring only facial invalidation or facial affirmance is unlikely to lead to real-world decisions by courts that
comport with the Constitution.
Does this mean that we should discard Professor Rosenkranz’s entire project? Not at all. His critical insight that the subjects of the
Constitution often explain which actor the constitutional provision is
targeted at restraining or empowering provides powerful tools for
understanding the substantive scope of those provisions. Thus, for
example, his understanding would seem to rule out any decision rule
that measured the constitutionality of a statutory enactment under
the Commerce Clause based upon how the President would choose,
in his own discretion, to enforce that enactment. That is because, as
a textual matter, the President’s actions cannot inform the scope of
congressional power. Just because that insight does not also track directly upon disagreements that courts and scholars have had about
when “facial” and “as-applied” challenges should be permissible does
not make Professor Rosenkranz’s work any less valuable or any less
worthy of study or understanding.

